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F
uelled by public distrust, a season 
of inquiries has begun into how 
governments and public health agencies 
responded to the A/H1N1 influenza 
pandemic. If these reviews are to be meaningful, 
they would do well to address the failures in 
communication both before and during the 
pandemic that helped create this public distrust.
The principal failure was this: instead of using 
the tools and principles of risk communication 
to create public understanding of the risks posed 
by a pandemic, experts and policy makers used 
another form of communication, advocacy, 
which is intended not so much to create 
understanding but to persuade the public to take 
certain actions.
These advocacy efforts were spurred by the 
events of late 2003 and 2004 when, with SARS 
(severe acute respiratory syndrome) fresh in 
everyone’s memory, H5N1 outbreaks emerged 
in poultry and humans in different parts of Asia. 
These outbreaks seemed to flu specialists and 
other public health experts a threat for which 
governments and the public needed to prepare. 
The public (and governments, except for public 
health agencies) were initially apathetic. And 
so there seemed to be a need to ring alarm bells 
to wake the public from its slumber and urge 
pandemic preparedness. Two well known risk 
communications consultants, Peter Sandman 
and Jody Lanard, captured the spirit of the times 
when they wrote of the feeling among infectious 
diseases experts of “a sense of impending 
disaster, a need to sound the alarm, alienation 
and frustration that people don’t get it.”
The spread of the virus, the high mortality 
rates in human cases,1 and the attendant 
media coverage created a more receptive 
public environment for messages about the 
dangers posed by H5N1. Communication 
messages focused on the severe human and 
economic costs of a pandemic, and in order 
to rouse governments and the public the 
1918 pandemic—rather than the 1957 and 
1968 pandemics—was used as an example to 
demonstrate how terrible it could be. These 
efforts began to pay off and the perception of a 
pandemic as a catastrophic event began to take 
root in the public mind.
The pandemic that emerged 
in 2009 was different from 
what the public had grown 
to expect from pre-pandemic 
communication. It arose 
not from an avian virus in 
southeast Asia, but from a 
swine originated virus in 
central America. Its severity 
and global impact were far 
less than had been expected. 
This gap between reality and 
prediction has produced a 
public backlash, with people 
questioning the competence 
and motivation of public health 
agencies, and a suspicion of 
the advice that is coming from 
them, including on vaccines.
Risk communication to create a public 
dialogue on the risks of a pandemic, rather than 
advocacy based on appeals to fear, would have 
been the correct approach to have used in the 
pre-pandemic phase. There is confusion in the 
public health community about the aims and 
goals of risk communication. It is about building 
a shared understanding with the public, about 
the nature of a risk and the measures needed to 
respond to it through dialogue. It is not about 
trying to persuade people. As a landmark study 
by the US National Research Council in 1989 
put it, the aim of risk communication is not for 
the audience to accept the views or arguments 
of the communicator, but to raise the level 
of understanding so that all those who are 
involved are adequately informed within the 
limits of available knowledge.
The experience of pre-pandemic risk 
communication shows why risk communication 
should be limited to providing information 
about risk, rather than attempting advocacy.
The communication of risk is about the 
communication of uncertainty: risks are events 
that are likely to occur in the future, but are by 
no means certain to do so. Any measures taken 
to mitigate future risks, whether a pandemic or 
natural disasters, have to be based on a shared 
understanding between those who have 
technical and scientific knowledge of the risk, 
and those who have to bear the risk, and take 
actions to mitigate it. This can happen only 
through a two way exchange of information 
that will contribute to a public understanding 
of the risk.
In the continuous building up of the 
scenario of a dangerous pandemic the 
scientific uncertainty that surrounded these 
predictions was never adequately conveyed. 
This was not because the scientists and policy 
makers were unaware of the uncertainty, 
but because they tended to downplay 
uncertainties for fear that advocacy for 
actions like pandemic preparedness would 
be compromised. A conflict existed between 
the needs of advocacy and the needs for 
transparent risk communications.
If any of the ongoing inquiries into 
pandemic management lead to greater 
efforts to understand the complexities of risk 
communication not merely during a global 
public health event, but also in the preparatory 
phases, they would serve a useful purpose.
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No need to ring alarm bells to wake the public from its slumber and 
urge pandemic preparedness
